Abstract. The issue of handling electronic health records have become paramount interest to the practitioners and security community, due to their sensitivity. In this paper, we propose a framework that enables medical practitioners to securely communicate among themselves to discuss health matters, and the patients can be rest assured that the information will only be made available to eligible medical practitioners. Specifically, we construct a new cryptographic primitive to enable File Sharing in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR). This primitive enables doctors to read the information sent by the hospital, or by any other individuals (such as patients' health records), when the doctors have their 'license' validated by that given hospital. We construct such a cryptographic primitive and capture its security requirements in a set of security models. Subsequently, we present a concrete scheme, which is proven selectively chosen-ciphertext security (CCA-1) secure under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) assumption and fully collusion resistant.
emergency cases). A literature review about security and privacy in EHR can be found in [2] .
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A hospital H (GM) generates and sends the public/secret key pairs (P K i , SK i ) for doctor U i , where i = 1, · · · , n. The government, the medical institute and the other medical legislators L j (CAs) create their public/secret key pairs (P K l1 , SK l1 ), (P K l2 , SK l2 ), (P K l3 , SK l3 ), · · · , (P K l k , SK l k ) respectively. The legislators then compute and give the certificates Certif i,j,l for doctor U i , where i = 1, · · · , n, j = 1, · · · , k, and time period T . Finally, a hospital staff member (Universe), for instance a nurse N , selects a subgroup of doctors S d = {U i1 , · · · , U i |S d | } and a subgroup of legislators S l , encrypts a message M for doctors in S d , legislators in S l and time period
Benaloh et al. [3] combined a Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) and a searchable encryption to obtain a privacy-preserving and patient-centered EHR system. However, the patients have to create and manage manifold keys and check the credentials of the healthcare providers (doctors, nurses, ...). Narayan et al. [10] proposed an EHR system using a broadcast Ciphertext-Policy AttributeBased Encryption (bCP-ABE) scheme, a variant of ABE system, and a Public key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) scheme. Their system is secure, allows private search on health records by performing keyword matching without leaking information, and enable direct revocation of user access without having to re-encrypt the data. But the system is only designed for online access control. More recently, Akinyele et al. [1] presented a system along with a mobile app for iPhone for secure offline access to EHRs. They constructed their scheme based on ABE (Key-Policy and Ciphertext-Policy versions) and they developped a corresponding software library to help the implementation.
Preliminaries and Definitions

File Sharing in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR)
A File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR) comprises four algorithms (Setup, Certif, Encrypt, Decrypt):
1. Setup(λ, n, k) run by the group manager, takes as inputs the security parameter λ, the total number n of users, and the total number k of cerfitiers, output the public parameters P K, the public/secret key pair (P K i , SK i ) for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. The public/secret key pair (P K c j , SK c j ) are independently generated by the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k}. We assume that n is the bound of the universe, in order to pre-compute public/secret key pairs and allow users to join the system later. 2. Certif(P K, (P K c j , SK c j ), P K i , l) run by the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, takes as inputs the public parameters P K, the certifier j's public/secret key pair (P K c j , SK c j ), the public key P K i for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and the time period l, output the certificate Certif i,j,l for i, j and l.
, run by the sender belonging to the universe, takes as inputs the public parameters P K, the subset S u of users selected by the sender such that S u ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, the subset S c of certifiers selected by the sender such that S c ⊆ {1, · · · , k}, the public keys P K i for users i ∈ S u , the certifier's public key P K c j for certifers j ∈ S c , and the time period l, output the header Hdr and the session key K.
takes as inputs the public parameters P K, the subset S u of users selected by the sender, the subset S c of certifiers selected by the sender, the time period l, the public/secret key pair (P K i , SK i ) and the certificates Certif i,j,l for user i and certifier j ∈ S c , and the header Hdr, output the session key K if i ∈ S u and Certif i,j,l is valid for time period l; otherwise ⊥.
We require that for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k} such that
, and subsets S u ∈ {1, · · · , n} and S c ∈ {1, · · · , k}: if user i ∈ S u , certifier j ∈ S c and Certif i,j,l is valid for time period l, then
We call the header, Hdr, as the encryption of the session key K. We call the full header as the header Hdr along with the descriptions of the set S u of users and the set S c of certifiers selected by the sender. Without losing generalization, we only consider the header Hdr when discussing the size of the scheme.
Security Requirements
We first present the definitions for chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and chosenciphertext attack (CCA) securities. We adopt the security definitions from the certificate-based encryption [7] . There are two basic attacks which may be launced by an uncertified user or by the certifier. These are captured in the following two distinct games. In Game 1, the adversary plays the role of an uncertified user: it first proves that it knows the secret key of the uncertified user and then, it can make Decryption and Certification queries. In Game 2, the adversary plays the role of a trusted certifier: it first proves that it knows the secret key of the certifier and then, it can make Decryption queries. Eventually, we say that the FSEHR system is secure if no adversary can win either game. Game 1. Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ, n, k) to obtain the public parameters P K, the public keys P K i for users i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and the public keys P K c j for certifiers j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and gives them to A 1 . Certification Query Phase. For time period l, for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and for j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, the challenger first checks that SK i is the secret key corresponding to the public key P K i . If so, it runs Certif and returns Certif i,j,l to the adversary A 1 ; otherwise, it returns ⊥. Decryption Query Phase. For time period l, for user i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and for certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, the challenger first checks that SK i is the secret key corresponding to the public key
u , the challenger first checks that SK * i is the secret key corresponding to the public key P K * i . If so, it chooses a set S * c ⊆ {1, · · · , k} and a random bit b ∈ R {0, 1}, and runs (Hdr
in the key space, and gives (Hdr * , K * b , K * 1−b ) to the adversary A 1 . Otherwise, it gives ⊥. Guess. The adversary A 1 outputs its guess b ∈ R {0, 1} for b and wins the game if b = b , (l * , S * u , Hdr * ) was not the subject of a valid Decryption query after the Challenge, and (l * , S * u ) was not subject of any valid Certification query.
We define A 1 's advantage in attacking the File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records for Game 1 with parameters (λ, n, k) as AdvFSEHR
Game 2. Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ, n, k) to obtain the public parameters P K, the public keys P K i for users i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, and the public keys P K c j for certifiers j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and gives them to A 2 . Decryption Query Phase. For time period l and for certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, the challenger first checks that SK c j is the secret key corresponding to the public . If so, it chooses a set S * c ⊆ {1, · · · , k} such that j ∈ S * c and a random bit b ∈ R {0, 1}, and runs (Hdr We define A 2 's advantage in attacking the File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records for Game 2 with parameters (λ, n, k) as AdvFSEHR 
Definition 1. We say that a File Sharing system in Electronic Health
We also mention the selective CCA security: a selective adversary A provides the set S * u ⊆ {1, · · · , n} that it wishes to be challenged on at the beginning of the security game.
We then define the Fully Collusion Resistance security, in order to capture the notion of encryption against arbitrary collusion of users. Let the number of users n, the number of certifiers k and the security parameter λ be given to the adversary A and the challenger. The game between the two entities proceeds as follows:
Game Fully Collusion Resistant 1. The adversary A outputs a set S u,n = {u 1 , · · · , u n } ⊆ {1, · · · , n} of colluding users.
2. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ, n, k) to obtain the public parameters P K, the keys pairs (P K i , SK i ) for users i ∈ S u,n , and the keys pair (P K c j , SK c j ) for the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · , k}. It gives (P K, {P K i , SK i : i ∈ S u,n }, {P K c j : j ∈ {1, · · · , k}}) to the adversary A and keeps SK c j to itself. It also runs the algorithm Certif(P K, (P K c j , SK c j ), P K i , l) to obtain the certificates Certif i,j,l for user i ∈ S u,n , j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and time period l, and gives them to the adversary A.
The challenger runs the algorithm Encrypt(P
and for a subset S c ⊆ {1, · · · , k}, and gives the resulting header Hdr to the adversary A and keeps the associated session key K to itself.
The adversary
where f is a function that takes as input public keys, secret keys or certificates, and outputs a new public key, a new secret key or a new certificate as a combination of public keys, secret keys or certificates, respectively. 5. The adversary A wins the game if K * = K.
Definition 2. We say that a File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records is fully collusion resistant if no t-time algorithm
A has non-negligible advantage in the above game.
Broadcast Encryption
A Broadcast Encryption (BE) system [6, 5, 4, 8] is made up of three randomized algorithms (Setup BE , Encrypt BE , Decrypt BE ) such that:
1. Setup BE (n) takes as input the number of receivers n. It outputs n secret keys d 1 , · · · , d n and a public key P K. 2. Encrypt BE (S, P K) takes as inputs a subset S ⊆ {1, · · · , n} and a public key P K. It outputs a pair (Hdr, K) where Hdr is called the header and K ∈ K is a message encryption key chosen from a finite key set K. We will often refer to Hdr as the broadcast ciphertext. Let M be a message to be broadcast that should be decipherable precisely by the receivers in S. Let C M be the encryption of M under the symmetric key K. The broadcast consists of (S, Hdr, C M ). The pair (S, Hdr) is often called the full header and C M is often called the broadcast body. 3. Decrypt BE (S, i, d i , Hdr, P K) takes as inputs a subset S ⊆ {1, · · · , n}, a user identity i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and the secret key d i for user i, a header Hdr, and the public key P K. If i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs a message encryption key K ∈ K. Intuitively, user i can then use K to decrypt the broadcast body C M and obtain the message body M .
We require that for all subset S ⊆ {1, · · · , n} and all i ∈ S, if (P K, 
Certificate-Based Encryption
An Efficient Construction
Our construction FSEHR is an effective combination of the BGW Broadcast Encryption (BE) scheme [4] and the Gentry's Certificate-Based Encryption (CBE) scheme [7] . Notice that the Gentry's CBE scheme is designed for a communication between one sender and one receiver. Therefore, applying the Gentry's CBE scheme directly to the BGW, will lead to the linear size of the headers in the number of users and of certifiers in the two respective subsets designed by the sender, which is impractical. However, we managed to overcome this issue and achieve constant size for header, secret keys and certificates. Moreover, our scheme FSEHR is proved selective CCA secure using the standard transformation from the REACT scheme proposed by Okamoto and Pointcheval [11] . Setup(λ, n, k). On input the security parameter λ, the total number n of users, and the total number k of certifiers, run (p, G, G T , e) ← GroupGen(λ, n, k). Pick at random g ∈ R G and α ∈ R Z p , compute
Pick at random γ ∈ R Z p and compute v = g γ . Choose three hash functions
For user i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, compute the user's secret key as
Independently, for j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, certifier j computes its own public/secret key pair as follows: choose at random an exponent σ j ∈ R Z p and then compute the public key w j = g σ j . Set the secret key as d c j = σ j .
Set the public parameters as d c j , i, l) . On input the public parameters P K, the certifier j's secret key d c j , the user i, and the time period l represented as a string in {0, 1} * , pick at random r i,j,l ∈ R Z p and compute the user's certificate e i,j,l = (e i,j,l,1 , e i,j,l,2 ) as follows:
On input the public parameters P K, a set S u ⊆ {1, · · · , n} of users, a set S c ⊆ {1, · · · , k} of certifiers, and the time period l, pick at random an exponent t ∈ R Z p , compute the session key K = e(g n+1 , g) t , and set the header Hdr = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 ) as follows:
On input the public parameters P K, a set S u ⊆ {1, · · · , n} of users, a set S c ⊆ {1, · · · , k} of certifiers, the time period l, the user i with its secret key d i and its certificates e i,j,l for j ∈ S c , parsed as (e i,j,l,1 , e i,j,l,2 ), and the header Hdr parsed as (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 ), check whether
= e(g, C 4 ), and output
Correctness. Notice that g
, · · · , n} with secret key d i and certificate e i,l,j for j ∈ S c ⊆ {1, · · · , k} decrypts as follows: We note that the total time in the algorithm Setup is substantial, but we recall that this algorithm should be run only once to generate the public parameters and the static secret keys for both users and certifiers. In the algorithm Certif, it requires 89, 40 milliseconds because k = 20 certificates are created. Finally, in the algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt, it takes 9, 66 and 16, 70 milliseconds respectively, mainly due to the cost of pairing computations.
Security Proofs
Assumption. We prove the security of our scheme FSEHR using the Decisional n-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) assumption, which is as follows. 
Definition 3. The (t, n, ε)-BDHE assumption says that for any t-time adversary B that is given
, e(g, h)
Selective CCA Security Proof. For simplicity, we write g i = g (α i ) for an implicitly defined α. B first takes 
Eventually, B gives A the public parameters -Upon receiving a query (w j , l j ) to the random oracle
• Otherwise, choose u j ∈ R Z p at random and compute 
• Otherwise, choose X j ∈ R G at random. Put ((W 1j , W 2j ), X j ) in L 2 and return X j as answer. -Upon receiving a query (K j , C 1j , C 2j , C 3j , C 4j ) to the random oracle H 3 for some j ∈ [1, q H 3 ]:
• If ((K j , C 1j , C 2j , C 3j , C 4j ), C 5j ) exists in L 3 , return C 5j .
• Otherwise, choose C 5j ∈ R {0, 1} λ at random. Put (K j , C 1j , C 2j , C 3j , C 4j ), C 5j ) in L 3 and return C 5j as answer. Challenge. B generates the challenge on the challenge set S * u as follows. First, B sets C * 1 = h and searchs in L 1 to get u that corresponds to (w j , l) such that j ∈
